Lebanese Election Guide
Breaking down the parties, alliances, and electoral districts
Lebanon’s 2022 parliamentary elections are finally upon us. Voting inside the country takes place this weekend, Sunday the 15th. Voting in the diaspora has already taken place, with the Lebanese Foreign Ministry saying turnout was slightly higher than in 2018.
The elections take place in the backdrop of a devastating economic collapse. Decades of bad economic practices by the government and financial mismanagement by the Central and commercial banks have led to massive inflation and the destruction of most people’s savings accounts, leaving people struggling to get by.
The protest movement that began in 2019 has lost most of its strength in the streets now that more people are worried about basic needs rather than politics. Despite this, opposition parties associated with the protest movement have made a big push to provide an electoral alternative to the establishment sectarian parties. Many of these establishment parties are poised to lose support, but it doesn’t mean that the opposition will necessarily make significant gains, as the movement is significantly divided.
This post will attempt to take stock of the political landscape going into the elections, and provide an explainer of the voting system, the main political parties competing, and some of the interesting dynamics going on in a few districts.
The voting system
There are 128 seats in Lebanon’s parliament, which are allocated between 15 electoral districts. Lebanon has a sectarian political system, and each of these seats are allocated to members of specific religious groups. Half are reserved for various Christian denominations, half are reserved for Muslims and Druze. However, this religious restriction only applies to the candidates for the seats. Voters can vote for candidates of any sect.
The system works on the basis of lists. Parties (and individuals) will collaborate to form lists that have candidates for all or some of the seats in a particular district. These lists are made with careful considerations to maximize the number of seats these different actors can win. The voters will vote for the list they like, and also cast a preferential vote for their preferred candidate in the list. If the list wins seats, the more preferential votes a candidate has, the higher their chances of being the candidate who gets to fill that seat. Every district has an electoral threshold corresponding with the number of seats. In a district with 5 seats, a list needs to get enough votes to win 1/5, so they need 20% of the vote. In a district with 11 seats, a list needs enough to win 1/11, so they need 9.1%. Seats are distributed proportionally among the lists that cross the threshold.
So, as an example, take a hypothetical district with 10 seats. The seat threshold is 10%. There are three Maronite seats, three Shia seats, three Sunni seats, and one Druze seat. The Orange list wins 40%, the Blue list wins 30%, the Yellow list wins 20%, the Red list wins 9%, and the Green list wins 1%. The Red and Green lists do not win any seats. The Orange list is allocated 5 seats, the Blues 3, the Yellows 2. Orange candidate B won the most preferential votes of any Maronite candidate, so he wins his first seat. Blue candidate A won the most of any Sunni candidate, and Yellow candidate C won the most of any Shia candidate. They win their seats. Counting continues. Orange wins all the Maronite seats, Blue wins all the Shia seats, Yellow wins two Shia seats. Because Orange is allocated five seats, they win the remaining Shia seat and the Druze seat, even though their respective candidates for the seats got far less preferential votes than other candidates for the position. The Red list (9%) candidate A won 90% of the votes among the Druze candidates but because his list did not pass the threshold he does not get the seat.
I hope this is a relatively clear explainer, the Lebanese electoral system is very complex and can lead to very weird situations. In 2018, candidate Eddie Demirjian was elected to the Armenian Orthodox seat in Zahle with only 77 preferential votes, the lowest out of any of the candidates for the seat, because the math worked out that his list won two seats and that was one of the ones allocated to them in the end.
The high electoral thresholds can be an impediment to opposition parties and independents entering parliament, and makes the supposedly “proportional” system not very proportional. The lowest threshold is in the Chouf-Aley district, which has 13 seats, but the threshold is still 7.7%, which is very high compared with the electoral threshold in many countries with proportional representation, which is often 5%, or 3%, or even lower. Because of the many flaws associated with the current system, many parties, both in the establishment and the opposition, have called for an electoral system that treats the entire country as one electoral district, which would be a more normal system, but this reform is generally opposed by Christian parties that feel their influence would be threatened.
The specific parties that compose each list vary from district to district. Most parties do not run in all areas of the country, sticking to where their sectarian support base is. Some parties may be allied with each other in one district, and on opposing lists in another. Major parties will form alliances with smaller actors to shore up electoral support.
A crucial issue in this election has been the division of the non-sectarian opposition parties. Most districts have two, three, or even more lists claiming to be “alternative”, which is likely to lead to vote splitting and voter demoralization. There are a number of reasons for these splits, including policy differences and power struggles between candidates (a bit more on opposition splits here). The Policy Initiative created a helpful visualization of the various list alliances, which can be found here, and I would recommend using it as a reference when reading the following section on the parties.
The political parties
Here we have profiles on the main parties competing in the election. Most of them are the main establishment sectarian ones, but I also take a look at the opposition. One of the main stories this election is the absence of former Prime Minister Saad Hariri’s Future Movement, which was the dominant force among Lebanese Sunnis. Hariri decided to announce a boycott from the elections, possibly worried about a disastrous result for the party in the wake of the protest movement.
This creates a big vacuum, as Future and allied independents won 20 seats in 2018. Despite Hariri’s instructions telling them not to, some current Future MPs are running for re-election, having cobbled together new alliances. One of the main organizers of the ex-Future current is former Prime Minister Fouad Siniora, who led the party in between Rafic Hariri’s death and Saad’s accession to the leadership. Siniora appears to be looking to play the role again of a kind of transitional leader in the Sunni community.1
In the profiles below, I use the terms “March 8 camp” and “March 14 camp”. I want to clarify these terms. These were formalized alliances beginning in 2005 at the end of the Syrian occupation that grouped together two poles of Lebanese establishment politics: pro-Syrian government parties and anti-Syrian government parties. These alliances were very defined in the 2009 elections, but became somewhat less so in 2018, particularly in the case of March 14. There were instances of alliances across the two camps, as well as competition between members of the same camp. Despite this, I use them because they are useful for describing the broad groupings that exist in Lebanese politics. You can see these in the alliances diagram I linked in the section above. The upper left cluster is March 8, upper right is March 14, or what’s left of it, and the bottom is the various opposition parties. With all that said, here are the parties.
Free Patriotic Movement
Acronym: FPM Leader: Gebran Bassil Sect: Christians Current seats: 20/128 Political position: Establishment, March 8 camp Running in: Everywhere except South II (Tyre), South III (Nabatieh), North II (Tripoli)
The FPM is the Lebanon’s largest Christian party. It was formally founded by now-President Michel Aoun ahead of the 2005 parliamentary elections after he returned to the country from his exile. Aoun had been a powerful general during the later years of the civil war, and for a time served as acting Prime Minister of one of the competing governments that existed during that period. Aoun’s forces were defeated by the Syrian army and he fled to exile, during which time he created the FPM as a movement for his supporters.
Aoun created an alliance with Hezbollah, giving the FPM a crucial ally in Aoun’s bid for power, and Hezbollah a cross-sectarian partner in order to deepen their legitimacy and give them support for their military actions from the political establishment. Aoun reconciled with the Syrian government, and between the FPM, Hezbollah, and the Amal Movement, created the March 8 alliance, a collection of broadly pro-Syrian government parties.
In 2015, Aoun handed leadership of the party over to his son-in-law, Gebran Bassil (politics is often familial, and Aoun has no sons, only daughters). In 2016 Aoun achieved his goal and was elected President by parliament, beating out several other Christian rivals after months of negotiations. Aoun’s election was facilitated in part by a deal with the Future Movement that installed Saad Hariri as Prime Minister.
The FPM was successful in the 2018 elections, winning the most seats and the largest share of the cabinet that was eventually formed. Since the beginning of the economic crisis and the October 2019 protest movement however, things have gone downhill for the FPM. Aoun has become old, feeble, and likely senile, and Gebran Bassil is widely despised. Despite Bassil taking over as the leader of the party, Aoun is the figure that supporters are/were attracted to. Bassil is just the manager. Rude chants about Bassil were ubiquitous at protests, and he was turned into one of, if not the main face of government corruption and incompetence.
By all accounts, support for the FPM has dramatically dropped in the last two-and-a-half years, with many of it’s former supporters joining the protest movement. The party has also suffered some schisms in parliament. Former Brigadier General Chamel Roukoz, also Aoun’s son-in-law, left the FPM’s parliamentary bloc in 2019. He was long seen as being resentful at being sidelined in favor of Bassil, and is a potential challenger for the leadership of the party. He also faces competition from Alain Aoun, the President’s nephew and another MP.
The FPM is likely set for a disastrous election result, which will probably spell the end for Gebran Bassil’s leadership. Combine that with the fact that Michel Aoun’s term is set to expire this year, and he is probably not long for this world anyway, and it looks likely that the FPM will not continue to be a major political force in years to come.
Once again the FPM is sharing lists with their traditional partners, Hezbollah and Amal, as well as smaller allies like the Armenian Tashnag in Beirut and the Druze LDP in Chouf and Aley. In the North III constituency however, where Bassil is looking to hold onto his seat, they will be competing against the Marada Movement and the SSNP, which traditionally align with March 8. They will also be competing against Michel Mouawad, a former FPM ally who won about 8,500 votes for their joint list in 2018, but is now running alongside the Kataeb.
Amal Movement
Leader: Nabih Berri Sect: Shia Muslims Current seats: 16/128 Political position: Establishment, March 8 camp Running in: Beirut II (West Beirut), Bekaa II (West Bekaa), Bekaa III (Baalbek), Mt Lebanon III (Baabda), South I (Saida-Jezzine), South II (Tyre), South III (Nabatieh)
The Amal Movement was founded just before the civil war, in 1974, by Musa al-Sadr, an Iranian cleric who was sent to Lebanon in 1959 to organize among the Shia community in Tyre. Sadr rose to prominence as an advocate for the poor, and drew many Shias away from the secular communist and socialist movements that many of them had been part of, and towards a sectarian politicized Islam. When the Syrian army invaded Lebanon, Amal joined their side, becoming Syria’s main local ally against both the leftist Lebanese National Movement and their Palestinian allies, and the rightist Lebanese Forces, as well as against Israel later in the war.
Sadr disappeared in Libya in 1978, likely killed by Gaddafi, though no clear explanation has ever been found. He was succeeded as Amal leader by Hussein el-Husseini, who was soon replaced by Nabih Berri, who has now led the party for more than 40 years. Amal was a key player in the civil war, even after the emergence of Hezbollah, with whom they originally competed for dominance in the Shia community. The two reconciled at the end of the war, and Amal’s formal militia was disbanded per the Taif Accords (Hezbollah was the one party allowed to keep their militia).
Berri was elected speaker of parliament in 1990, a position he remains in to this day, and became one of the main powerbrokers of Lebanese politics, working with Rafic Hariri and Walid Jumblatt to oversee the country’s neoliberal turn in the 90s. Together with Hezbollah and the FPM, they formed the March 8 alliance in 2005, but while they are now close allies with their Shia sister party, Amal and the FPM have particularly poor relations, despite running on electoral lists and forming governments together. Berri and Bassil have frequently gotten into heated disputes in parliament, and of the current campaign Bassil recently said their alliance with Amal is “not political”, only an “electoral alliance”.
Most of Amal’s lists are shared with Hezbollah. The two Shia parties do not compete against each other in any districts. Hezbollah is the larger of the two in terms of voters, but they allow Amal to run more candidates, giving them more seats. Between the two of them, they only failed to win one of the country’s Shia seats in 2018.2 Polls suggest Amal’s support has dropped dramatically since 2019, while Hezbollah’s has not, raising questions as to how long the Party of God will be able to keep their allies afloat.
Hezbollah
Leader: Hassan Nasrallah Sect: Shia Muslims Current seats: 12/128 Political position: Establishment, March 8 camp Running in: Beirut II (West Beirut), Bekaa II (West Bekaa), Bekaa III (Baalbek), Mt Lebanon I (Jbeil-Keserwan), Mt Lebanon III (Baabda), South II (Tyre), South III (Nabatieh)
Hezbollah is easily Lebanon’s most famous party, as well as its largest, by number of supporters. Its name meaning “Party of God”, Hezbollah was created in the early 1980s as a resistance group against the Israeli occupation. Ideologically the party draws inspiration from the Iranian Revolution, and follows wilayat al-faiqh, or the Guardianship of the Jurisprudent, a Shia Islamist doctrine that, in short, follows the political direction of the Iranian Supreme Leader. Hezbollah received training and financial backing from Iran, allowing it to become a major actor in the Lebanese civil war, and the main force in the resistance against Israel.
The Taif Accords that ended the civil war allowed Hezbollah alone to maintain their militia (as a serious armed force, many other parties still have groups of men with guns that could be described as “militias”). In 1992, party leader Abbas al-Moussawi was assassinated by the Israelis, and replaced by Hassan Nasrallah, a charismatic cleric who remains leader to this day. The party has deepened its military capabilities since, and successfully repelled the 2006 Israeli invasion, as well as participating in the Syrian civil war as a crucial ally of the Assad government.
Hezbollah competed in parliamentary elections following the end of the civil war, but was not deeply involved in parliamentary politics until the mid-2000s, when it created the March 8 Alliance and joined the cabinet for the first time. Still, Hezbollah has not been as deeply entrenched in the political system as other parties, including their allies Amal and the FPM, and has mostly taken peripheral, less important ministerial portfolios.
Because of this, the party does not tend to face the same allegations of corruption as the other major parties, even from its biggest critics. The most anti-Hezbollah voices say the party is an Iranian puppet occupying Lebanon, and that it must be disarmed, while for others, the issue is that Hezbollah, even if it is not corrupt, gives support to those who are, and to the neoliberal economic status quo.
Despite its polarizing effect, within the March 8 camp Hezbollah is actually the glue holding everyone together, mediating disputes between Amal and the FPM, or FPM and Marada. The party also has decent relations with the Future Movement, and has consistently supported Saad Hariri for the premiership. Its main rival in parliament is the Lebanese Forces, and to a somewhat lesser extent the Progressive Socialist Party.
Hezbollah only runs candidates in districts with Shia seats. Most of their MPs come from the South II and South III districts (5) or Baalbek-Hermel (4). It is unlikely that Hezbollah will lose any of their seats since their candidates always have high preferential vote scores, meaning even if their lists lose votes, the seat losses will be felt by their less popular allies. Hezbollah could win more seats if they wanted, but prefer to allow Amal to remain a sizable parliamentary force. The two parties have separate blocs in parliament, but usually go together, so if they were to be considered as one bloc it would be the largest in parliament.
The party has some electoral cooperation with the FPM and shares lists with them in West Beirut, Baabda, Jbeil-Keserwan, and Zahle. They also share lists with the SSNP, and some smaller, independent or minor party allies, several representing pro-March 8 Sunni voters.
Lebanese Forces
Acronym: LF Leader: Samir Geagea Sect: Christians Current seats: 15/128 Political position: Establishment, March 14 camp Running in: All districts except Beirut II (West Beirut), South III (Nabatieh)
The Lebanese Forces is one of the two major Christian parties in the country. It was created by Samir Geagea out of the Lebanese Forces militia following the civil war. The LF militia was originally a coalition of right-wing Christian parties that united to fight against the leftist Lebanese National Movement and the Palestinian Liberation Organization, and included the Pierre Gemayel’s Kataeb, Camille Chamoun’s National Liberal Party, and Sleighman Frangieh’s Marada Movement. The coalition became plagued by infighting, and the Kataeb even perpetrated massacres against the NLP and Marada in order to consolidate power.
Geagea rose up in the ranks of the militia over the course of the war, and became leader of a faction of it in the mid-1980s. In the final months of the war, he fought against Aoun’s forces for leadership of the Christians, until the conflict ended with the Taif Accords.
Geagea was jailed in 1994 over the assassination of Prime Minister Rashid Karami during the war, but the movement of his supporters carried on, participating in the movement against the Syrian occupation. Geagea was released from prison in 2005 and quickly became one of the country’s main political leaders, with the LF becoming the sixth largest party in the 2005 election. The party formed a major part of the March 14 coalition and has been the most vocally anti-Hezbollah/Syria voice in the political sphere, but has also participated in several broad coalition governments that include Hezbollah.
While Hezbollah is a favorite target of the LF, their main rival is the FPM, with whom they compete for dominance over the Christian electorate. Geagea wants to be President, but was unsuccessful in his 2014 bid. Two years passed before parliament was able to agree on who to elect, and Geagea ended up being sidelined for Michel Aoun. Now, he is rivals with Gebran Bassil and Marada leader Sleighman Frangieh for the position. The election is supposed to be held later this year, and the parliamentary election results will be very important to that outcome. If March 8 forces win a majority as they did in 2018, Geagea will have no chance.
After the protests broke out in 2019, the Lebanese Forces resigned from the government and have remained in the opposition since, unlike all the other major parties in parliament, which are currently in government together. LF have attempted to portray themselves as being against the establishment, but this is not really taken seriously by anyone and their electoral alliances have reflected this fact. Their partners are the same as ever, the Progressive Socialist Party, ex-Future Movement candidates, and the various minor parties that are also part of the old March 14 camp, minus the Kataeb, who ran with LF previously but have split from them this year.
The one opinion poll we’ve seen shows the LF up from their 2018 result, ahead of the FPM, so this election could be their opportunity to become the largest Christian party. They have the backing of Saudi Arabia (and to a degree their Gulf allies and the US), who considers the LF to be their best bet to take on Iran/Hezbollah in the region, since Saad Hariri proved incapable to do so. With the withdrawal of the Future Movement from the elections, there has been a push from pro-Gulf media outlets for Sunni voters to vote for the LF, despite their long history as a sectarian Christian party. If a decent chunk of these voters do go towards the LF or their list allies out of anti-Hezbollah sentiment, it could help them in some mixed regions like Akkar or Saida-Jezzine.
Progressive Socialist Party
Acronym: PSP Leader: Walid Jumblatt Sect: Druze Current seats: 7/128 Political position: Establishment, March 14 camp Running in: Beirut II (West Beirut), Bekaa II (West Bekaa), Mt. Lebanon III (Baabda), Mt. Lebanon IV (Chouf-Aley), North II (Tripoli)
It probably bears mentioning right off the bat that the PSP is not a socialist or progressive party and has not been for several decades. It is the oldest of the major parties, having been founded in 1949 by Kamal Jumblatt, heir to a prominent line of Druze chieftains. Despite Jumblatt’s aristocratic background, the party championed social justice and secularism, and was a leading voice for Lebanon’s closer cooperation with the Arab world, in contrast with the Christian right’s affinity towards the West.
The PSP was one of the main participants in the 1958 uprising against right-wing President Camille Chamoun, which was put down with the help of an American intervention. Jumblatt spent several years as a cabinet minister in various positions, and by the 1970s was leading a coalition of left wing and Arab nationalist parties, which became the Lebanese National Movement, which allied with the Palestinian Liberation Organization, which was based in Lebanon after they were kicked out of Jordan.
Political, sectarian, and class tensions leading up to 1975 culminated in the start of the civil war, which pitted the LNM and the PLO against the Lebanese Forces. The PSP was the most powerful component of the LNM, and the alliance had significant success against the LF until the Syrian army invaded Lebanon in 1976 and prevented LNM advances. Jumblatt was assassinated in 1977 when gunmen attacked his car. It has never been discovered who ordered the attack but most suspect the Syrian government.
Jumblatt was succeeded by his son Walid, who leads the party to this day. Jumblatt Jr. is much less of a political idealist than his father, and under his leadership the PSP has dropped it’s “progressive socialist” characteristics and transformed into a purely sectarian party. Jumblatt’s leadership has been characterized by constantly shifting alliances, allying the party with the Syrian regime just after his father’s death, and later shifting away and opposing Syria.
At the end of the war, Jumblatt became one of the main leaders crafting the postwar neoliberal order, along with Rafic Hariri and Nabih Berri. The PSP joined the anti-Syrian March 14 camp in 2005, moved closer to March 8 in 2011, and then back to March 14 a few years later, and ran in alliance with Future and LF in the 2018 elections.
The PSP does not have a real rival for Druze leadership. The only other major Druze zaim is Talal Arslan of the FPM-aligned Lebanese Democratic Party, but Arslan has a much smaller support base than Jumblatt. However, the PSP is definitely at risk of losing votes to the new opposition parties. The main Druze region of the country, Chouf and Aley, saw significant protest activity in 2019-2020, and the PSP has almost certainly lost a significant chunk of its support.
Kataeb Party
Leader: Samy Gemayel Sect: Christians Current seats: 0/128 Political position: Opposition, former March 14 camp Running in: Beirut I (East Beirut), Mt Lebanon I (Jbeil-Keserwan), Mt Lebanon II (Metn), North III (Bcharre-Koura-Zgharta-Batroun), Mt Lebanon III (Baabda) [independent allies], Bekaa I (Zahle) [independent allies]
The Kataeb Party was founded in 1936 by Pierre Gemayel, who was originally inspired by Spain’s Falange and Italy’s Fascist Party.. The party espoused conservatism, Lebanese nationalism, and anti-communism and anti-Arabism, and was largely backed by Christians. It became one of the most important parties in the country throughout the 20th century, and participated in several governments, and backing Camille Chamoun against the 1958 uprising. Kataeb opposed the presence of Palestinian refugees and militants in Lebanon in the 1970s, and the Kataeb’s militants had sporadic conflicts with PLO forces, culminating in the 1975 massacre of a bus of Palestinian civilians by Kataeb troops, which began the Lebanese Civil War.
Kataeb was one of the main participants of the war as part of the Lebanese Forces, and was the perpetrator of several massacres, including against its own allies. In the post-war era its influenced waned as it was suppressed and controlled by the Syrian occupation. The party participated in the protests against the Syrian occupation, and formed part of the "March 14" camp. Kataeb joined in several governments, but ended its participation in cabinet in the mid 2010s. Kataeb has mostly been led by members of the Gemayel family, and its current leader, Samy Gemayel, is the grandson of Pierre Gemayel. Since the 2019 protests, Kataeb has positioned itself as an opposition party, supporting the protests and running against its old allies in this year’s elections. Their three MPs resigned from parliament in 2020 following the Beirut port explosion. However, Kataeb’s positioning has not been accepted by all other opposition parties—some are running in alliances with it, many are not. Their main support base comes from East Beirut and the adjoining Metn district, where they may be able to make gains this year.
Syrian Social Nationalist Party
Acronym: SSNP Leader: Rabi Banat Sect: Non-sectarian Current seats: 3/128 Political position: Establishment, March 8 camp Running in: Beirut II (West Beirut), Mt. Lebanon II (Metn), North I (Akkar), North III (Bcharre-Koura-Zgharta-Batroun), South III (Nabatieh)
The SSNP was founded in Beirut in 1932 by Antoun Saadeh, with the aim to promote Syrian nationalism, or pan-Syrianism, which posits that the countries in and around the Levant—Syria, Lebanon, Palestine, Jordan, Iraq, Cyprus, Kuwait, and parts of Turkey and Egypt, are all part of "Greater Syria". The party believes that this area should form the basis of a new nation-state, an idea opposed by both Lebanese nationalism and pan-Arabism. It’s sort of a “third positionist” party and has been accused of being fascist, and while the party rejects this description, some of Saadeh’s writings were about the racial superiority of “Syrians”. A complete account of this question, and the ideology of the party, is too deep to go into here.
Historically the SSNP has only been a significant political force in Lebanon and Syria. It was banned and Saadeh was executed after it attempted an uprising against the Lebanese government, but it remained a significant political force throughout the 20th century, often oscillating between the Lebanese left and right on political conflicts.
The party aligned with the "March 8" camp in 2005, which coincided with the party’s legalization in Syria, after decades of tension with the Baathist government. The SSNP has been a close ally of Hezbollah ever since, and won three seats running alongside them in the 2018 elections. In 2020, the party suffered a factional split after reformist Rabi Banat was elected the party president, against the wishes of the old guard faction led by MP Assaad Hardan. In this weekend’s elections, the two factions are running candidates on differing lists, including in one case against each other in the North III district, where the Banat faction candidate is allied with the Free Patriotic Movement, and the Hardan faction candidate running alongside the Marada Movement.
Citizens in a State
Acronym: MMFD Leader: Charbel Nahas Sect: Non-sectarian Current seats: 0/128 Political position: Opposition Running in: All districts
Citizens in a State is one of Lebanon’s biggest opposition parties. It was founded in 2016 by Charbel Nahas, a former Labor Minister who resigned in 2012 over the government’s opposition to his proposed reforms. The party advocates secularism, social protection, and the creation of a "civil state", which would sever Lebanese citizens’ reliance on sectarian leaders by providing services and infrastructure through the government. MMFD stands out from the other opposition parties in that it is running candidates in every district in the country. Most of these candidates are on lists that only include MMFD, or a couple other parties, in contrast to most other opposition parties which mostly formed broad alliances. Some have criticized MMFD, saying they split the opposition vote, but their response is they prefer to advance a single, clear programmatic agenda rather than be part of a jumble of vaguely-defined opposition groups with no real platform other than being against the political establishment.
The party has a detailed platform, which includes implementing universal healthcare and distributing financial losses from the economic crisis towards the banks rather than depositors. The party has received criticism from some sectors for their position on Hezbollah’s weapons. MMFD believes Hezbollah’s military power should remain as a deterrence against Israel, but ultimately be transitioned so that it is under the state, not a specific party. It is unclear what areas MMFD will have the strongest results in, but it may be where high-profile candidates are running for the party, like Charbel Nahas (East Beirut) and journalist Jad Ghosn (Metn). Their closest ally is the Lebanese Communist Party, with whom they are sharing four lists. Personally I would say the MMFD and LCP lists/candidates are the best options, other opposition parties have unclear economic positioning, and may not really be interested in taking on the banks as well as the political establishment. MMFD is hoping for a vote total for their lists, even if they don’t win seats, as they believe it would position their platform as the clear alternative agenda to the ruling class.
Electoral districts
These are just a few of the districts I had some specific thoughts on and time to write a bit about.
Beirut I (East Beirut)
Beirut I is a Christian district, with half of its eight seats going to Armenian sects and the other half going to other Christian denominations. This is the only district where lists associated with the opposition movement won a seat in 2018, with journalist Paula Yacoubian being elected on the Sabaa Party ticket. Sabaa kicked Yacoubian out of the party after she was apparently difficult to work with, and she resigned from Parliament after the Beirut port explosion in protest of the government. She is back this year, running with a newer party called Tahalof Watani. Reportedly Yacoubian tried to personally dominate the protest movement list in the district, and negotiations with her group and another party, Beirut Madinati3, to ally, fell through. Thus there are three opposition lists—Yacoubian, with the parties Tahalof Watani and ReLebanon, Beirut Madinati, and MMFD running their own separate list, which includes party leader Charbel Nahas.
There is also the Kataeb list, led by Nadim Gemayel, cousin of party leader Samy Gemayel. East Beirut is a traditional stronghold for Kataeb. They are in an alliance with prominent independent Jean Talozian, who is backed by banker Anton Sehnaoui, who is bankrolling the list. As much as Kataeb would like to present themselves as a force for change, it is clearly farcical due to the close alliance with a wealthy banker.
The final two lists are the Lebanese Forces, in alliance with the Armenian Hunchak party, and the FPM, in alliance with the Armenian Tashnag party. Or it might be more accurate to say the Tashnags in alliance with the FPM, since the Armenian party brought more than half the votes to the list in 2018.
Curiously, on the topic of the Armenian vote, MMFD is not running candidates for any of the four Armenian seats in the district. I’ve heard that they might be doing it as a favor to Paula Yacoubian (who is Armenian) and they don’t want to split that vote away from her, but that explanation doesn’t make much sense to me if their main goal is to win as many votes as possible for all their lists. What’s more, MMFD actually isn’t running any Armenian candidates across the whole country. There are two other Armenian seats outside of Beirut I—In Zahle and in Metn. MMFD is running lists in both districts, but no candidates for the Armenian seats. Seems weird, but hard to think of any real motive behind it.
Anyway, all the traditional lists are good bets to win seats, with Kataeb possibly leading the pack. Paula Yacobian also has a good shot of getting in again, on name recognition. It’s a question as to whether MMFD will make it. Charbel Nahas is a very high profile candidate and will be a good vote-getter, but the lack of Armenian candidates might cost them, though this is not to say of course that the party hasn’t done outreach to Armenian voters, and this exact kind of focus on sectarian politics is what the party is trying to move beyond anyway.
South I (Saida-Jezzine)
This is an interesting district, it combines the coastal city of Saida, which has two Sunni seats, with the non-geographically contiguous Jezzine region, which has two Maronite seats and a Greek Catholic seat. This district has the lowest number of seats in the country, and a massive 20% electoral threshold that lists need to pass in order to win any of them.
In the 2018 election, four lists competed there: Firstly, the Future Movement list, which got most of its votes from Saida, and which was led by Bahia Hariri, Saad Hariri’s aunt. Second, a joint list between the leftist Popular Nasserist Organization of Osama Saad in Saida, and the Amal Movement in Jezzine. Third, a joint list between the FPM in Jezzine, and two forces in Saida—Jama’a Islamiyyah, a moderate Sunni Islamist party with connections to the Muslim Brotherhood, and former Saida mayor Abdul Rahman Bizri of the Bizri family, which has been one of the historically prominent families in the city, often competing with the Saad family for power in the 20th century. The fourth list was a smaller list between the LF and Kataeb that failed to win any seats.
This year, the alliances are slightly different. Osama Saad has split the PNO away from March 8 and fully committed to the protest movement. He is running in an alliance with Bizri this year, with minor independent allies on their list in Jezzine.4 I wrote more extensively about the PNO in a previous post. Amal and the FPM failed to agree on an alliance and are running separately again, each without strong allies in Saida. The Future Movement’s withdrawal from the elections leaves a vacuum, but a former FM election strategist is running in Saida on a joint list between him and the LF’s candidates in Jezzine. Jama’a Islamiyyah is not running any candidates.
Several other lists, mostly associated with the opposition, are also running, but very unlikely to win seats due to the high threshold. This includes MMFD’s list, which failed to come to an agreement with Osama Saad over programmatic differences, despite the two being generally close allies in the protests.
The question then becomes how will the five seats get divided between three or four lists. The PNO’s votes plus Bizri’s votes in 2018 added up to about 20.4% of the total votes in the district. The FPM’s added up to about 19.8%. Amal’s added up to about 17.8%. It is important to remember that the Future Movement boycott will likely lower the amount of votes cast, so whatever it took to get 17.8% in 2018 may be more than enough to get over 20% this year.
I think PNO/Bizri are in the strongest position due to their association with the opposition and the absence of significant Sunni opposition to them in the district. It seems likely they will gain votes from last time, though Saad may lose the votes of Hezbollah and Amal-supporting Shias in Saida (about 10% of the population), who were directed to vote for him in 2018.
For Amal and FPM the situation is a bit trickier, since polling suggests both parties have suffered significant declines in support. I wouldn’t bet against either of them passing the 20% threshold due to the expected lower turnout from Sunnis in Saida, but theoretically it’s possible they, or the ex-Future/LF list don’t make it past the threshold and the PNO/Bizri list wins all five seats in the district with a plurality of votes. Unlikely, but a guy can dream.
More likely, I think, is that Saad and Bizri each win their seats, and two or three of the establishment lists pass the threshold, winning the three Christian seats in Jezzine. It is also possible that the ex-Future candidate in Saida wins the second Sunni seat ahead of Bizri and one of the PNO’s minor allies in Jezzine wins a seat instead (assuming that this list comes first and is allocated two seats).
South II and South III (Zahrani-Tyre and Marjaayoun–Hasbaya–Nabatieh–Bint Jbeil)
I’m grouping these two together because they’re very similar political landscapes. Both districts are deep in the south of Lebanon, where Shias are the majority and Hezbollah and Amal are in control. They are so in control, in fact, that of the seven seats in South II and the 11 seats in South III, the joint Hezbollah-Amal lists won every single seat in both these districts in 2018, with 80-90% of the vote. They were utterly unchallengeable, no other list was able to break the threshold.
This time, opposition forces are hoping to make a dent. South III is the only district in the country where there’s a unified opposition list. It’s a clear one on one fight between two lists. Hezbollah and Amal are running for all the Shia seats, and are joined by Kassem Hachem of the Baath Party in the Sunni seat, Assaad Hardaan of the SSNP in the Greek Orthodox seat, and banker Marwan Kheireddine in the Druze seat. The last case has caused controversy for the Shiite duo. Kheireddine’s inclusion is a favor to LDP leader Talal Arslan, who in 2018 ran a separate failed list in the district. The inclusion of a banker on the list at a time when people are suffering through an economic crisis caused by the banks has drawn criticism towards Hezbollah and Amal. Question will be if it costs them votes.
The opposition list is a cluster of groups, foremost among them the Lebanese Communist Party, which has its historical base in the south. Though much smaller than both Hezbollah and Amal, for many years it has been the largest opposition to them in the region. Now, with the momentum from the protest movement, the LCP is hoping to make a comeback. The list also includes candidates from MMFD and other opposition parties. They would need to win about 9.1% of the vote in order to win a single seat and beat the duo’s monopoly.
In South II, the situation is complicated a bit by the presence of a second opposition list. The first list is more or less the same as in South III, with the LCP, MMFD, and allies. The second is composed of independents who are taking a mixed stance on March 8. Pro-Hezbollah and the resistance, but anti-Amal. The main figure on the list is prominent lawyer Bushra Khalil, who reportedly attempted to run alongside Hezbollah but was rebuffed. Whether it is due to her criticism of Amal or the fact that she is a woman (Hezbollah does not run any women candidates) is unclear. This list also includes Riad Assad, who in 2018 won about 1,600 votes for the LCP-led opposition list. From what I have heard, the Bushra Khalil list seems to be getting more traction than the LCP/MMFD one.
Whether or not the opposition will be able to win any seats in South II is unclear. The lower number of seats means a higher electoral threshold, and combined with the decided opposition, it is less likely the opposition will succeed in winning a seat than in South III, where they have more factors working for them.
That’s all for now, looking forward to the elections tomorrow. Not sure how long results will take but they should all be in within a couple of days. You can follow my coverage of the results at @AsiaElects on Twitter, and I would also recommend checking out L’Orient Today’s coverage. I’ll probably be back later this week with another post taking a look at the outcome. If you enjoyed this coverage, consider subscribing.
I’m not doing a profile on Future since they aren’t running, so I’m just getting all that out of the way there.
In the Mount Lebanon I district, due to Christian votes for another list. The Hezbollah candidate still received the most preferential votes of all the Shia candidates there.
Beirut Madinati came close to success in the 2016 Beirut municipal elections as an opposition list, winning around 40% of the vote against the unified establishment list. It did not run in the 2018 parliamentary elections but is more organized this year, nominating candidates in both Beirut districts as well as in other parts of the country. Their list in Beirut II recently announced their withdrawal from the race for the sake of opposition unity, though they will remain on the ballot.
This list is endorsed by the Communist Party.